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FAIR USE: AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE? 
Lydia Pallas Loren* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. solidified 
the treatment of fair use as an affirmative defense. However, treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense shifts the burden to the defendant while in most fair use cases plaintiffs 
are able to easily prove a prima facie case of infringement. This Article identifies that, 
despite its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken a thorough 
analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in Section 107 of the Copyright 
Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. In fact, as explored in this Article, the legislative 
history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history 
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an 
affirmative defense; a defense, yes, but not an affirmative defense. The negative 
consequences of labeling fair use an affirmative defense support shifting back to what 
Congress intended. Fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead 
be treated as a defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights. 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 686 
I. BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 688 
A. The Prima Facie Case of Infringement: An Easy Burden ....... 688 
B. Defense Versus Affirmative Defense ...................................... 690 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EVOLUTION OF FAIR 
USE INTO AN “AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE” ............................. 692 
A. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ........................................ 692 
B. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises ........... 694 
C. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc. ........................................................................................... 695 
III. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1976 
ACT................................................................................................ 696 
A. Statutory Language .................................................................. 697 
B. Legislative History of the 1976 Act ........................................ 699 
C. Later Legislative History ......................................................... 703 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING FAIR USE AS AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE .......................................................... 705 
A. Pleading ................................................................................... 705 
* Robert E. Jones Professor of Advocacy and Ethics, Lewis & Clark Law School. I thank my 
colleagues Professors Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Anna Laakmann, Erin Ryan, Ozan Varol, and 
James Oleske for their feedback on an early stage of this project; as well as Professors Jessica 
Litman, Pamela Samuelson, Ned Snow, and participants at the Third Pacific Intellectual Property 
Scholars (PIPS) conference hosted by the University of Washington and Seattle University for 
feedback on an earlier draft. 
685 
                                                     
09 - Loren.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:28 PM 
686 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:685 
B. Burdens of Proof...................................................................... 706 
C. Amplifying the Burden on Speech .......................................... 709 
V. TREATING FAIR USE DIFFERENTLY—AS A DEFENSE ...... 710 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 712 
 
INTRODUCTION 
No one doubts that the fair use doctrine is a critically important part 
of U.S. copyright law.1 As the Supreme Court described in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,2 fair use provides a guarantee of “breathing 
space within the confines of copyright.”3 If the doctrine holds this 
critical place in the scheme of copyright, is the Supreme Court correct to 
label fair use an “affirmative defense”? 
In Campbell the Supreme Court not only repeated the declaration it 
had first made less than ten years earlier, that fair use is an affirmative 
defense,4 it went further to comment on the burden that it thought 
followed from that label. Specifically, in addressing the fourth factor 
courts should consider when evaluating whether a use is fair—the effect 
of the putative fair use on “the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”5—the Court stated: “Since fair use is an affirmative 
defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of 
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant 
1. Indeed, the academic literature on the subject is rich and deep. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); 
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
2. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
3. Id. at 579. 
4. Id. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). Harper 
& Row was the first time the Supreme Court used the label “affirmative defense.” A few lower 
courts had used the label prior to the Supreme Court’s use of the term. See Ned Snow, The 
Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 160, 161 n.146 (2011) (citing cases). 
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). Section 107 provides four factors courts may consider in evaluating 
whether a use is a fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
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markets.”6 In this sentence the Supreme Court not only cemented the 
label “affirmative defense,” it also made clear the defendant should 
shoulder the “burden of demonstrating fair use.”7 
Much has been written concerning the nature of fair use: Is it a right, 
or merely a privilege?8 Some might claim that my focus here is on a 
much more mundane and procedural question:9 Did Congress intend for 
courts to treat fair use as an affirmative defense, or was the fair use 
inquiry meant to be part of the prima facie inquiry into the question of 
infringement? Indeed, for many fair use cases, the issue of the burden of 
proof has not been a central component of the basis for the decision. The 
power of the procedural argument, however, may take on increased 
importance as courts begin more frequently to use the allocation of the 
burden as a reason to deny defendants’ assertions of fair use.10 More 
fundamentally, “[s]ubstantive rights . . . are worth no more than the 
procedural mechanisms available for their realization and protection.”11 
Part I of this Article provides background on the current approach to 
the prima facie case of copyright infringement and the difference 
between a defense and an affirmative defense. Part II explores the 
Supreme Court’s statements concerning the nature of fair use as an 
affirmative defense, taking the Court’s cases in reverse chronological 
order. This section shows that the Court has not yet undertaken a 
thorough analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. 
After identifying the statutory language that cuts against treating fair use 
as an affirmative defense, Part III then turns to the legislative history of 
the 1976 Act. It describes the specific legislative history relied on by the 
Supreme Court as well as other statements in the legislative history 
6. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.  
7. Id. 
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985); Snow, 
supra note 4.  
9. Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal 
Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292–93 (2000). Professor Burbank 
notes that “neglecting the terrain of procedure is, as it always has been, a mistake. Fundamentally, 
that is because procedure is power, whether in the hands of lawyers or judges.” Id. Or as put more 
succinctly by Congressman John Dingell, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the 
procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before 
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce). 
10. See, for example, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), 
discussed below. 
11. Burbank, supra note 9, at 1293. 
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concerning the nature of the fair use doctrine, including language 
contained in the final House and Senate Reports. The legislative history 
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not 
intend fair use to be an affirmative defense—a defense, yes, but not an 
affirmative defense. Part IV explores some of the consequences of 
treating fair use as an affirmative defense and some of the legal 
maneuvers employed by defendants and the courts to soften the more 
serious problems. Finally, Part V argues that the Supreme Court should 
revisit its use of the affirmative defense label and should conclude that 
fair use is not an affirmative defense but is a mere defense that shapes 
the scope of a copyright owner’s rights. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Prima Facie Case of Infringement: An Easy Burden 
Treating fair use as an affirmative defense shifts the burden to the 
defendant with little needed from the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima 
facie case of infringement, thus opening the door to the wide range of 
remedies permissible under the Copyright Act.12 For example, in a case 
alleging infringement of the reproduction right, the plaintiff must prove 
only ownership of a valid copyright (often demonstrated by presentation 
of the copyright registration certificate)13 and “copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.”14 Proving this actionable 
copying typically has two components. First, the plaintiff must establish 
actual copying—that the defendant copied from the plaintiff rather than 
having independently created a similar work. In fair use cases, this first 
component of actionable copying is almost always undisputed. The 
second component of actionable copying requires the plaintiff to 
establish that “the copying amounts to an improper or unlawful 
appropriation.”15 This element is also, often, quite easily demonstrated. 
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2012) (specifying the remedies available to include injunctive relief, 
seizure and impoundment, actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees). To be 
entitled to the statutory damages that the Copyright Act provides as well as the possibility of an 
award of attorney’s fees, the plaintiff also will need to demonstrate that the copyright in the work 
had been timely registered. Id. § 412. The Supreme Court has noted the “potent arsenal of remedies” 
provided to copyright owners. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 
(1984). 
13. Indeed, for works first published in the United States, copyright registration is a prerequisite 
to filing an infringement action. Id. § 411; see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 
(2010). 
14. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
15. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 
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What copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation is 
sometimes phrased as a showing that the defendant’s work has 
“‘substantial similarity’ to protected expression in the earlier work.”16 
To prove substantial similarity, a plaintiff must show “(i) that it was 
protected expression in the earlier work that was copied and (ii) that the 
amount that was copied is ‘more than de minimis.’”17 To constitute 
“protected expression” it must satisfy the requirement of originality. 
However, the originality standard is exceedingly low, requiring only a 
“modicum of creativity,” and again is often easily shown.18 
The remaining criterion of the prima facie case of infringement 
requires only an evaluation of what the defendant copied: Was too much, 
i.e. more than a de minimis amount, of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
expression copied? The prima facie case does not require any 
examination of the reason that the defendant copied the expression or 
any proof of harm to the plaintiff, which makes the determination of 
how much copying is too much an abstract inquiry with no reference 
point. However, factors that help anchor the determination of how much 
is too much copying are embedded in the fair use inquiry. For example, 
when considering the fair use question, courts are directed to consider 
the purpose the copier seeks to achieve and the harm such copying 
causes the copyright owner, both helpful considerations when 
determining if defendant’s copying was improper.19 Indeed, fair use 
injects a much needed concept of harm to the copyright owner20 to keep 
1998) (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
16. Id. (citations omitted).  
17. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 
2003) (citation omitted). While the Ninth Circuit employs a different terminology in the 
infringement inquiry, involving an evaluation of both “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” similarity, the 
ultimate elements the plaintiff must demonstrate to carry its prima facie case are the same. See, e.g., 
L.A. Printx Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012). Indeed, in fair use 
cases, often Ninth Circuit opinions do not even engage in the extrinsic and intrinsic inquiries. See, 
e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 
F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). 
18. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 362. For an interesting discussion of how to change that 
standard and why raising the bar for copyrightable expression might be a good idea see Joseph Scott 
Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451 (2009).  
19. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (2013) (arguing that in a case of nonliteral infringement it would be 
appropriate to require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant copied “a substantial enough quantum 
of expression from the plaintiff’s work as to cause commercial harm to the plaintiff’s actual or 
reasonably foreseeable markets or to her incentives to engage in creative work”). 
20. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
969, 973 (2007) (defining the relevant copyright harm as “the uncompensated violation of an 
exclusive right that would be likely to have a material effect on a reasonable copyright owner’s ex 
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the scope of copyright owner rights from interfering with the underlying 
constitutional objective of copyright law.21 Instead of considering those 
factors in the context of making a determination of whether the plaintiff 
has demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement, courts hold the 
prima facie case satisfied22 and then turn to the defendant’s affirmative 
defense of fair use. 
B. Defense Versus Affirmative Defense 
The difference between treating fair use as a defense and treating it as 
an affirmative defense is significant. Not only does the label “affirmative 
defense” trigger a pleading obligation,23 but it also has an important 
consequence when it comes to the burden of proof. A defense is simply a 
“reason why the plaintiff . . . has no valid case.”24 For example, a 
defense could be that the copying engaged in by the defendant was not 
an “improper” or “unlawful” appropriation (perhaps we would call the 
defendant’s copying fair). 
In contrast, the defendant bears the burden of proof for an affirmative 
defense, although that obligation only becomes important after the 
plaintiff has demonstrated its prima facie case.25 An affirmative defense 
stems from the common law pleading of “confession and avoidance” 
pursuant to which the defendant would admit the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case and allege new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s case and 
excuse the defendant’s conduct.26 As the Supreme Court has further 
ante decision to create or distribute the work”). 
21. The Constitution grants Congress the power to adopt a copyright act providing exclusive 
rights to authors, but it also states a goal for the grant of that authority: “To promote the Progress of 
Science . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. At the time of the Constitution, “Science” meant broadly 
“knowledge and learning.” See Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). But see 
Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259, 259 (2013) 
(arguing that the word “Science” had a more narrow meaning at the time of the framing). 
22. There are a few cases in which the court concludes that the copying engaged in by the 
defendant was de minimis, although those courts often note that such considerations could also be 
handled in the context of the fair use defense. See, e.g., Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony 
Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710–12 (N.D. Miss. 2013). 
23. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any . . . affirmative defense . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “Defense”). 
25. Id.  
26. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1270 (3d ed. 2004). The problem of how to treat aspects of a civil case is by no means unique to 
copyright law. For example, in basic tort law, a debate is just now surfacing concerning “whether 
consent is an affirmative defense or whether lack of consent is an element of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case . . . .” See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and 
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explained, when the burden of proof is placed on one party, that means 
the burden of persuasion will remain with that party, even if the burden 
of production may shift depending on the nature of the evidence each 
party offers.27 
Determining whether a particular defense should be treated as an 
affirmative defense is “not without some difficulty.”28 The Fifth Circuit 
has indicated that at least three related considerations may help in this 
determination: “(1) whether the matter at issue fairly may be said to 
constitute a necessary or extrinsic element in the plaintiff’s cause of 
action; (2) which party, if either, has better access to relevant evidence; 
and (3) policy considerations: should the matter be indulged or 
disfavored?”29 Given that the prima facie case of infringement already 
requires the plaintiff demonstrate that the copying by the defendant was 
“improper,”30 it seems that whether a use is fair or not would constitute a 
necessary or extrinsic element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Further, 
as discussed in more detail below, the copyright owner often has better 
access to relevant evidence on the fair use factors.31 Finally, because of 
the important First Amendment role fair use plays in copyright law,32 
fair use should be indulged, or at least certainly not disfavored. 
Placing the burden of proving or disproving fair use may play a 
significant role in the outcome of a litigated case at a variety of stages, 
from the issuance of a preliminary injunction33 to the ultimate 
determination of infringement liability.34 And, of course, who bears the 
burden of proving a use was (or was not) a fair use affects the settlement 
posture of the parties, as well as the behavior of potential fair users even 
prior to the filing or threat of litigation.35 
Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1586 (2012). 
27. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 101 (2008); see also Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331–33 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing burdens of proof, 
persuasion, and production in the summary judgment context). 
28. Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987). 
29. Id. (citation omitted). 
30. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra Part IV.B. 
32. See infra Part IV.C. 
33. See, for example, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007), 
discussed below and infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text. 
34. See Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), discussed below, 
and infra notes 129–134 and accompanying text. 
35. See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1781 (2010) (discussing the chilling effect on speech of treating fair use as an affirmative 
defense). 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EVOLUTION OF FAIR 
USE INTO AN “AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE” 
The Supreme Court has directly addressed arguments concerning 
whether a defendant’s use is a fair use in only three cases: Sony 
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,36 Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,37 and Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.38 Those three opinions, understandably, exert 
enormous influence on the treatment of an assertion of fair use. In the 
evolution of the doctrine of fair use into an affirmative defense carrying 
consequences for the assignment of the burden of proof, the Campbell 
opinion is, by far, the most significant. Of the many lower courts that 
reflexively identify the fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense, most 
cite Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., for that proposition.39 
A. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 
A significant part of the Campbell opinion concerns the consequences 
of employing presumptions in the fair use analysis—presumptions of 
unfairness40 and of market harm41 that may or may not flow from the 
defendant’s use being commercial. In the arguments concerning 
presumptions, both the plaintiff and the defendants used the label of 
affirmative defense. 
First, the defendants as petitioners asserted in their opening brief: 
“The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright 
Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law 
doctrine.”42 Plaintiff-respondent Acuff-Rose was far more forceful in its 
characterization. After noting that in drafting the fair use provision of the 
statute Congress had “resisted pressures from special interest groups to 
create presumptive categories of fair use,” and had instead “structured 
the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case 
36.  464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
37.  471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
38.  510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
39.  See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275 n.31 (11th Cir. 2001); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998). 
40. Campell, 510 U.S. at 583–84. 
41. Id. at 591. 
42. Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 8, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993 WL 
391046. 
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analysis,”43 respondent then turned to the resulting burden on the 
defendants: 
In assessing the evidence under [the § 107] factors, it bears 
emphasis that fair use is an affirmative defense, see Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 561, and that, accordingly, the burden of 
proving fair use lies with the proponent of the defense. H.R. 
Rep. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 n.3 (1992) . . . .44 
Responding to that assertion, the defendants failed to attack the 
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense45 but instead 
highlighted that the Supreme Court had also identified the doctrine as “a 
mixed question of law and fact,” and that therefore the burden on the 
defendant was “at best uncertain.”46 At oral argument, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist directly asked counsel for defendants, Bruce S. Rogow, if fair 
use was an affirmative defense and counsel’s response was unequivocal: 
QUESTION: Is fair use an affirmative defense? 
MR. ROGOW: It is. 
QUESTION: So the burden of negating fair use in a motion for 
summary judgment, then, is on the person claiming the fair use? 
MR. ROGOW: The ultimate burden is to show fair use as the 
affirmative defense as these factors unfold . . . .47 
Defendants’ lawyer was not focused on the significance of that 
concession. Instead, he was far more focused on undoing the 
consequences of the presumptions that the Court of Appeals had 
employed. The Court of Appeals had held that those presumptions, 
stemming from language the Supreme Court had used in Sony 
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., made a use 
“presumptively unfair” if a defendant’s use was commercial in nature.48 
This presumption shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the 
“unfairness” of the use. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the 
43. Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 10–11, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993 
WL 391058 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)) 
44. Id. at 21. The statements contained in the 1992 House Report concerning a bill that sought to 
add a new sentence to the end of § 107 are discussed below. See infra notes 104–111 and 
accompanying text. 
45. This failure was understandable given the Supreme Court’s use of the label in Harper & Row. 
46. Reply Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 4 n.2, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 
1993 WL 638228. For this assertion, defendants cited Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561. 
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Campbell , 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993 WL 
757656, at *19. 
48. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
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Court of Appeals and held that no such presumption was warranted.49 
Yet, by labeling fair use an affirmative defense, the Court had created a 
presumption: without proof of the affirmative defense of fair use, the 
plaintiff would prevail on its infringement claim due to the plaintiff’s 
demonstration of its prima facie case of infringement. 
In its opinion in Campbell the Supreme Court cited two sources 
identifying fair use as an affirmative defense: its own opinion, from less 
than a decade prior, in Harper & Row and a statement contained in a 
1992 House Report.50 The legislative history is explored in Part II, 
below. The next section examines the treatment of fair use as a defense 
in the Court’s Harper & Row decision. 
B. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 
In Harper & Row the Court refers to fair use as a defense six times.51 
Only once, while discussing the first fair use factor, does the Court add 
the adjective “affirmative.”52 The distinction between a mere defense 
and an affirmative defense is significant.53 Importantly, while the 
plaintiffs in Harper & Row referred to fair use as a defense in their 
briefs,54 they never once used the significantly different label of 
affirmative defense. The defendants never even used the label “defense” 
in their brief55 and neither term was uttered during the oral argument of 
the case.56 
The paragraph from Harper & Row which contains the only reference 
to fair use as an “affirmative defense” reads in full: 
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identified 
news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation’s use. 
News reporting is one of the examples enumerated in § 107 to 
“give some idea of the sort of activities the courts might regard 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 590 n.20 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561; H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 n.3 
(1992)). These two sources were cited to the Court in Respondent’s Brief. See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
51. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549, 550, 551, 554, 561 (1985). 
52. Id. at 561. 
53. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. Part III explores the significance of this 
distinction. 
54. Brief for the Petitioners at 19 n.3, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 
83-1632), 1984 WL 565760; Reply Brief for the Petitioners at ii, 9, 13, 14 n.7, 15, 16, Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565762. 
55. See Brief for Respondents, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565761. 
56. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632).  
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as fair use under the circumstances.” Senate Report, at 61. This 
listing was not intended to be exhaustive, see ibid.; § 101 
(definition of “including” and “such as”), or to single out any 
particular use as presumptively a “fair” use. The drafters resisted 
pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive 
categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an 
affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1967); Patry 477, n.4. 
“[W]hether a use referred to in the first sentence of section 107 
is a fair use in a particular case will depend upon the application 
of the determinative factors, including those mentioned in the 
second sentence.” Senate Report, at 62. The fact that an article 
arguably is “news” and therefore a product use is simply one 
factor in a fair use analysis.57 
It is this page to which the Campbell opinion refers. However, in 
context, it is clear that in Harper & Row the Court was not concerned 
with the consequences of labeling fair use an “affirmative defense” but 
rather was concerned with rejecting the defendant’s argument that use of 
copyrighted material as “news” meant the use was presumptively a fair 
use. In fact, as discussed more fully below, the legislative history to 
which the Court cites does not use the label affirmative defense and 
instead provides: “The committee believes that any special statutory 
provision placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or the other 
would be unfair and undesirable.”58 
C. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
The first time the Court addressed the fair use doctrine after the 
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act was in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.59 Tellingly, the Sony opinion 
never refers to fair use as an affirmative defense, or even as a defense for 
that matter. Instead, the Court focused on the statutory language, noting 
that Section 106 prefaces the grant of rights to copyright owners as 
“subject to sections 107 through 118” and that  “[t]hose sections 
describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that ‘are not 
infringements of copyright notwithstanding the provisions of § 106.’”60 
57. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-473). 
58. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967). While this House Report is from 1967, the general 
revision of the Copyright Act was not adopted until 1976. 
59. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
60. Id. at 448. 
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Even the dissenters, who would have found the use at issue to be 
infringing, speak of fair use as one of “a number of exemptions and 
limitations on the copyright owner’s rights.”61 In other words, the first 
time the Court addressed the codification of the fair use doctrine it 
viewed fair use as part of what shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s 
rights. As part of that overall inquiry, the Sony Court indicated some 
presumptions could aid in the determination of whether a use was fair.62 
But Sony never assigned the burden of proof on any aspect of fair use to 
the defendant. 
Other Supreme Court opinions confirm a conception of fair use not as 
an affirmative defense, but rather as an integral part of shaping the rights 
of a copyright owner and even keeping copyright from transgressing the 
First Amendment.63 For example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft64 the Court 
relied heavily on fair use as one of “copyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards”65 that significantly reduces the pressure to employ 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny to congressional action relating to 
copyright.66 In Harper & Row, the Court rejected a separate First 
Amendment defense to copyright infringement, relying instead on fair 
use to safeguard the First Amendment interests at stake.67 As an 
important balance in copyright that the Court has repeatedly pointed to 
when considering separate First Amendment challenges to copyright 
law, relegating fair use to the status of an affirmative defense weakens 
its significant balancing role. 
III. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1976 ACT  
The first time the Supreme Court used the label “affirmative 
defense”68 it cited two sources as support: a 1967 House Report and a 
treatise on copyright law.69 Textualists assert that resort to legislative 
61. Id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 449 (majority opinion). 
63. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 221 (2003). 
64. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
65. Id. at 221. 
66. The Court holds that so long as Congress “has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” Id. 
67. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S 539, 555–60 (1985). 
68. Id. at 561. 
69. The treatise, written by William Patry, asserts that fair use is an affirmative defense and cites 
for support two circuit court opinions and four district court opinions. PATRY, supra note 8. The 
specific footnote of this treatise cited by the Supreme Court, footnote 4, cites the final House and 
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history is only appropriate if the language of the statute is unclear.70 On 
the question whether fair use is an affirmative defense, one can view the 
statute as quite clear: fair use is not an affirmative defense. The 
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act also supports this reading 
of the statute by never once referring to fair use as an “affirmative 
defense.” It is only in legislative material concerning later amendments 
to the statute that the label of affirmative defense is used. These later 
legislative materials do not provide adequate support for treating fair use 
as an affirmative defense. 
A. Statutory Language 
Section 106 conditions the rights granted to a copyright owner as 
“subject to Sections 107 through 122.”71 Additionally, Section 107 
provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section[] 106 . . . the 
fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”72 
Combined, these two statutory sections seem to clearly support viewing 
fair use not as an affirmative defense but rather as part and parcel of 
what defines the rights of a copyright owner.73 “Absent some reason to 
believe that Congress intended otherwise, . . . the burden of persuasion 
lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.”74 It seems 
appropriate that the plaintiff who seeks relief in a copyright infringement 
Senate Reports, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) and S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975), yet 
neither of those Reports use the label “affirmative defense,” nor make any statement concerning the 
burden of proof. PATRY, supra note 8, at 477 n.4. The footnote provides a “see also” citation to a 
1984 House Report concerning proposed amendments to other sections of the Act that does use the 
label “affirmative defense” when referring to fair use. Id. The footnote then discusses how, after 
statements on early revision efforts in the legislative history indicated the burden of proof should 
not be assigned to either party, the legislative history is then silent on the issue of who should bear 
the burden of proof on fair use. Id. 
70. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Ratzlaf v. United States, 
510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (finding that where “[t]here are . . . contrary indications in the statute’s 
legislative history . . . we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”); 
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 
(1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative 
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 395 (1999) (noting the 
“clear and unmistakable pattern of decline in the use of legislative history by the Supreme Court”). 
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
72. Id. § 107. 
73. Judge Birch has indicated his belief that the characterization of fair use as an affirmative 
defense does not comport with the statutory language. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 
(11th Cir. 1996). 
74. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57–58 (2005). 
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lawsuit must prove infringement including that a use is not a fair use. 
The language of Section 108, identifying the “right of fair use,”75 
furthers the textual argument that the statute does not treat fair use as an 
affirmative defense in the style of “confession and avoidance.”76 A 
defense is any reason that the plaintiff should not prevail.77 On the other 
hand, an affirmative defense is relevant only once the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case has been proven.78 If fair use is “not an infringement,” then 
the plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of 
infringement without overcoming the argument that the use is a fair use. 
Some may argue that fair use is an “exception” and that when one 
seeks to rely on an exception or an exemption from a statutory 
prohibition, the burden of proving a “special exception to the 
prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its 
benefits.”79 The statutory language contradicts treating fair use as an 
exception: It is, “not an infringement,” instead a limitation on the scope 
of the rights granted to copyright owners. 
The phrasing of Section 107 can be contrasted with other limitations 
placed on the rights that the Copyright Act grants to copyright owners. 
For example, Section 109 provides that an owner of a lawfully made 
copy of a copyrighted work “is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy.”80 This is a codification of the first sale doctrine, an affirmative 
defense against the claim of infringement of the copyright owner’s right 
to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public.81 Tellingly, 
Section 109 does not refer to such a resale as “not an infringement of 
copyright”; rather, it provides an “entitlement” to the owner of a 
lawfully made copy.82 Another example is Section 1008, specifying that 
“[n]o action may be brought under this title” for certain noncommercial 
75. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (providing that “[n]othing in this section . . . in any way affects the right 
of fair use as provided by section 107”). 
76. See supra note 26. 
77. See supra note 24. 
78. See supra note 25. 
79. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948); see also Javierre v. Cent. 
Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) (opinion for the Court by Holmes, J.). 
80. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Similarly, subsection (c) of Section 109 provides that the owner of a 
lawfully made copy “is entitled . . . to display that copy publicly.” Id. § 109(c). 
81. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 
82. For an argument that the right protected by 109 and the first sale doctrine is not an affirmative 
defense see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual & Personal Property, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (2015) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399983 
(exploring the first sale doctrine and the requirement of ownership in a digital transactions). 
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uses by a consumer of a digital audio recording device or medium.83 
Again, the statute does not identify this noncommercial use as “not an 
infringement”; rather, it prohibits suit against such users. 
Further, this approach to the fair use inquiry comports with the 
statement of the prima face case of infringement. As described earlier,84 
as part of its prima facie case of infringement a plaintiff must establish 
that the copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation. How 
is a court to determine if the copying is “improper” or “unlawful” 
without a reference to something? In some cases the threshold becomes 
one of “more than de minimis” copying, examining the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of what has been copied.85 Yet that inquiry, 
concerning the amount that the defendant has copied, is a specific factor 
in the fair use inquiry.86 Indeed, determinations of the “propriety” of the 
copying at issue would seem to call out for an inquiry into the fuller 
context of the copying engaged in by the defendant. The language of 
Sections 106 and 107 support such an approach. 
B. Legislative History of the 1976 Act 
As just described, a strong case can be made that the statute is clear 
and unambiguous concerning the nature of the fair use doctrine as being 
part of the inquiry into the prima facie question of infringement. When a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, one should not typically resort to 
legislative history.87 However, the Supreme Court cited legislative 
history as support for labeling fair use as an affirmative defense. 
Specifically, the Harper & Row decision cited page thirty-seven of a 
1967 House Report.88 Yet neither on page thirty-seven nor any other 
page in that House report (or any other House or Senate Report leading 
up to the Copyright Act of 1976), is the doctrine referred to as an 
affirmative defense. 
83. 17 U.S.C. § 1008. It is important to note that a digital audio recording device and medium are 
specifically defined in the Act and exclude general-purpose computers. See A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2001). 
84. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
85. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).  
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (directing courts to consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” when considering whether the use is a fair use).  
87. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). Even where “[t]here 
are . . . contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history . . . we do not resort to legislative 
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994). 
88. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967)). 
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The 1967 House Report specifically cited by the Supreme Court 
contains eight pages addressing fair use. The second sentence of that 
discussion identifies fair use as a “defense” to infringement: “The claim 
that a defendant’s acts constituted a fair use rather than an infringement 
has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the 
years, and there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the 
doctrine and applying it.”89 In the ensuing nine-page discussion, the 
1967 House Report never uses the word “defense” again. 
In fact, the Court’s label of “affirmative defense” is contradicted by 
the very report to which the Court cited. A significant difference exists 
between a defense and an affirmative defense.90 Most importantly, an 
affirmative defense is one on which the defendant bears the burden of 
proof. Yet on the page of the House Report to which the Supreme Court 
cites the first time it uses the label “affirmative defense,” the House 
Report not only does not use the label, it expressly characterizes fair use 
as not an affirmative defense: “The committee believes that any special 
statutory provision placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or 
the other would be unfair and undesirable.”91 This is an express 
disavowal of an intent to treat fair use as an affirmative defense. 
The intent that the statute not be read to place the burden of proving 
fair use on the defendant is a theme found in much of the legislative 
history of the 1976 Act. In 1965 the head of the U.S. Copyright Office 
issued a Supplementary Report explaining the modifications to the 
previous bill made by new bills introduced in February 1965.92 In that 
Report, the Register describes the debate over treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense and concludes that the draft bill refuses to adopt the 
position of treating fair use as an affirmative defense: 
The author-publisher interests have suggested that fair use 
should be treated as a defense, with the statute placing the 
burden of proof on the user. The educational group has urged 
just the opposite, that the statute should provide that any 
nonprofit use for educational purposes is presumed to be a fair 
use, with the copyright owner having the burden of proving 
otherwise. We believe it would be undesirable to adopt a special 
rule placing the burden of proof on one side or the other. When 
89.  H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 29 (1967). 
90. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
91. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967). 
92. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF 
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at foreword (Comm. Print 1965) (explaining the 
report’s purpose to describe in detail the 1965 bills, H.R. 4347 and S. 1006, 89th Cong.). 
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the facts as to what use was made of the work have been 
presented, the issue as to whether it is a “fair use” is a question 
of law. Statutory presumptions or burden-of-proof provisions 
could work a radical change in the meaning and effect of the 
doctrine of fair use. The intention of section 107 is to give 
statutory affirmation to the present judicial doctrine, not to 
change it.93 
Instead, Harper & Row’s single use of the label “affirmative defense” 
set in motion the “radical change” the Register of Copyrights feared, 
citing as support legislative history that did not, in fact, support such a 
marked departure from the traditional fair use doctrine. And Campbell, 
for all of the positive influence that decision has had on the doctrine of 
fair use,94 provided the cement that locked in treatment of fair use as an 
affirmative defense. 
While Harper & Row relied on a 1967 House Report, the general 
revision of the Copyright Act was not adopted until 1976.95 The final 
House and Senate Reports also do not contain any reference to fair use 
as an “affirmative defense” nor do they provide any statements 
concerning the assignment of the burden of proof. Both reports use the 
label “defense.” However, calling fair use a “defense” is entirely 
consistent with fair use being a component part of what shapes the rights 
of a copyright owner. Labeling something a “defense” does not 
necessarily carry with it an obligation of proving the elements of the 
defense.96 It is the label of “affirmative defense” that indicates the shift 
of the burden to the defendant.97 
93. Id. at 28. 
94. See e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615 
(2015) (reviewing the laudable analytical framework Campbell created for considering the bearing 
of market effects on the fair use determination); Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 
90 WASH. L. REV. 597 (2015) (describing Campbell as a “beautifully reasoned opinion, which has 
demonstrated in its twenty-one years that it provides a healthy framework for fair use analysis”); R. 
Anthony Reese, How Much Is Too Much?: Campbell and the Third Fair Use Factor, 90 WASH. L. 
REV. 755 (2015) (analyzing the important and beneficial change Campbell brought to the third 
factor of the fair use analysis); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
869 (2015) (exploring the evolution of the “transformative” inquiry in fair use case law following 
Campbell). 
95. The path to the Copyright Act of 1976 is a complicated one that began in the 1950s. “The 
official legislative history is long, comprising more than 30 studies, three reports issued by the 
Register of Copyrights, four panel discussions issued as committee prints, six series of 
subcommittee hearings, 18 committee reports, and the introduction of at least 19 general revision 
bills over a period of more than 20 years.” Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and 
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 865 (1987). 
96. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
97. Id. 
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Several of the statements made by the Register in his 1965 
Supplementary Report are echoed in the final House and Senate Reports, 
including the desire to affirm the fair use doctrine but not to change it.98 
Giving affirmation to the extant judicial doctrine meant treating fair use 
as part of the inquiry of infringement, not as an affirmative defense.99 
Indeed, in the case that is most often credited as the fountainhead of the 
fair use doctrine, Folsom v. Marsh,100 Justice Story did not cast his 
inquiry as one based on a “defense”; rather, the factor-based evaluation 
that we now call fair use was the central inquiry into whether the 
defendant’s use invaded the right of copyright.101 Justice Story described 
the evaluation of the quantity of copying as “the real hinge of the whole 
controversy, and involves the entire merits of the suit.”102 While he did 
not use the phrase “fair use,” he also never viewed the inquiry into the 
magnitude of the copying, the reasons for it, or the harm to the plaintiff’s 
market as anything other than the central question of infringement. As 
described by Professor Ned Snow, for Justice Story “the principles of 
fair use did not represent a doctrine independent from the question of 
infringement that would merit a distinct label; those principles were part 
and parcel with the criteria for determining infringement.”103 
Thus, if a court is interested in relying on the legislative history of the 
1976 Copyright Act, rather than the clear statutory language, the 
repeated discussion of not assigning the burden of proof to the defendant 
and not changing extant fair use law indicates that it would be error to 
conclude that Congress intended fair use to be treated as an affirmative 
98. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial 
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 
(1975) (same).  
99. See Snow, supra note 4, at 159–61 (2011) (discussing the state of the law at the time leading 
up to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
100. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
101. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 
1131 (2010) (“[B]ecause Folsom did not create a fair use defense as such, but rather redefined the 
test of infringement, Folsom arguably would have required the copyright holder to bear the burden 
of proof on the issue of harm as part of the burden to prove infringement.”). 
102. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347. 
103. Snow, supra note 4, at 147 (footnotes omitted). Professor Snow attributes the shift in 
thinking of fair use as a defense first to a treatise published in 1925 by Richard DeWolf, id. at 155–
56 (citing RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925)), asserting that fair 
use was based on a tacit consent. If based on tacit consent, then it would make sense to require the 
defendant to prove the existence of such consent. The DeWolf treatise was then cited in a 
subsequent copyright treatise in 1944 by a well-known commentator, Horace Ball. Id. at 157 (citing 
HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). DeWolf cited 
no support for his description of fair use as stemming from a theory of implied consent, and the 
cases Ball cited, when examined closely, do not support that conception of fair use. Id. at 155–57. 
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defense. 
C. Later Legislative History 
While Campbell relied on Harper & Row for its characterization of 
fair use as an affirmative defense and Harper & Row had relied on a 
House Report that did not label fair use an affirmative defense, 
Campbell also cited a later 1992 House Report.104 This House Report 
concerned a bill, H.R. 4412, that proposed adding a final sentence to the 
end of Section 107 relating to the fair use of unpublished works.105 The 
addition of that final sentence to Section 107, as spelled out in the House 
Report, was meant “to clarify the intent of Congress that there be no per 
se rule barring claims of fair use of published works.”106 That 
amendment, itself, had nothing to do with the fundamental nature of the 
doctrine of fair use. “Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction 
in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.”107 
Campbell, however, cites this 1992 House Report as support for the 
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense. The “Summary 
and Purpose” Section of the 1992 House Report provides: 
The purpose of H.R. 4412 is to clarify the intent of Congress 
that there be no per se rule barring claims of fair use of 
published works. Instead, consistent with Congress’s 
codification of fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act, the courts are 
to determine the affirmative defense of fair use of unpublished 
works on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of all the 
factors set forth in Section 107, title 17 United States Code, as 
well as any other factors a court may find relevant. The purpose 
of this legislation is thus to direct the courts to give proper 
weight to all factors; it is not the committee’s intention to direct 
the courts how much weight to give to any factor in a particular 
case.108 
The 1992 Report later repeats the affirmative defense statement, 
adding that as an affirmative defense, fair use “is relevant only after a 
copyright owner has made out a prima facie case of infringement.”109 
104. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.20 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
102-836, at 3 n.3 (1992)). 
105. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 1. 
106. Id. 
107. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011). 
108. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 1. 
109. Id. at 3. 
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The only authority cited by this House Report to support this assertion is 
Harper & Row.110 This 1992 House Report should not be accorded the 
weight of contemporary legislative history; it is dubious support for 
congressional intent concerning a law passed over fifteen years earlier, 
in 1976.111 
* * * 
In the end, the support for concluding that Congress intended the 
codification of fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act to signal a shift from 
treating fair use as a defense to treating it as an affirmative defense is 
non-existent. Describing fair use as an affirmative defense has gone 
largely without question since the time of Harper & Row.112 However, 
the Supreme Court is not foreclosed from ruling on the nature of fair use. 
As the Court has noted, “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an 
argument that they never dealt with.”113 Given the consequences that 
flow from treating fair use as an affirmative defense, the Court should 
examine the statute, the legislative history, and the policy behind fair use 
and conclude that fair use is part of the inquiry into the prima facie 
question of infringement. 
110. Id. at 3 n.3. The Report also criticizes as contrary to Harper & Row an unpublished district 
court opinion that “erroneously held that where the copyright owner seeks a preliminary injunction, 
the copyright owner bears the burden of disproving the defense.” Id. (citing Coll. Entrance 
Examination Bd. v. Cuomo, 90-CV-437, at *11 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1992)). This footnote goes 
on to specify that “the burden of proving fair use is always on the party asserting the defense, 
regardless of the type of relief sought by the copyright owner” citing only Harper & Row for 
support. Id. 
111. Post-enactment legislative history has “little probative value because a post-enactment 
legislative body has no special insight regarding the intent of a past legislative body.” Laborers’ 
Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court 
has noted that “even when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely 
override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative 
history prior to its enactment.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 118 n.13 (1980). 
112. Judge Birch of the Eleventh Circuit, while acknowledging that the Supreme Court has 
indicated that fair use is an affirmative defense, nonetheless has articulated that as a matter of first 
principles, fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001). 
113. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citing United States v. 
L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)); see also Miller v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 991 
F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is a venerable principle that a court isn’t bound by a prior decision 
that failed to consider an argument or issue the later court finds persuasive.”). 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING FAIR USE AS AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Campbell’s use of the affirmative defense label, with its further 
statement concerning the burden that follows from that label, has led to 
certain consequences relating to the fair use doctrine. From pleading to 
proof, from settlement to chilling creative activity and speech, treating 
fair use not as a mere defense but as an affirmative defense impacts both 
litigation and behavior. 
A. Pleading 
As an affirmative defense, fair use is subject to the pleading 
requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
mandating a statement of affirmative defenses in the defendant’s 
answer.114 Failure to plead an affirmative defense generally results in a 
waiver of that defense.115 Also, courts generally lack the ability to raise 
an affirmative defense sua sponte.116 
Courts do not always strictly adhere to this pleading requirement. For 
example, courts have granted dismissals on the basis of a clear fair use 
without waiting for an answer pleading the affirmative defense.117 
Particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s more recent articulation of a 
heightened pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal118 and Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,119 if fair use were not treated strictly as an affirmative 
defense, we could see more pre-answer dismissals in cases of clear fair 
use because the plaintiff’s claim of infringement is not plausible.120 
More recently however, Iqbal and Twombly, may in fact be having 
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any 
avoidance or affirmative defense.”); see also Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239–
40 (11th Cir. 2010).  
115. Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1239 (citing Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 
1012 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
116. Id. (quoting Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
117. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting the argument “that an unpleaded affirmative defense of fair use is an improper basis for 
granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)” and affirming dismissal of copyright 
infringement claim on fair use grounds under Rule 12(c)). 
118. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
119. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
120. For an example of a court’s willingness to do this, see Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. 
Sony Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (combining an inquiry into 
substantial similarity, de minimis copying, and fair use to conclude the plaintiff’s claim of copyright 
infringement should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). 
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the opposite effect. Specifically, lower courts have held that the 
plausibility standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly applies to 
affirmative defenses.121 Thus, treating fair use as an affirmative defense 
means that not only must a defendant assert fair use in the answer to the 
complaint, but the defendant must also allege sufficient facts that make 
fair use plausible. Without such facts, a court may grant a motion to 
strike the defense of fair use, removing consideration of the defense 
from the case early in the proceedings.122 
B. Burdens of Proof 
Who bears the burden of proof in a civil case, provides a “winner” in 
the case of a tie. When the evidence is in equipoise, the party on whom 
the burden of proof rests loses.123 Thus, treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense requires the defendant to produce sufficient 
evidence124 on which a court could find in favor of the defense. The 
Campbell Court made that clear in the penultimate paragraph of the 
opinion: 
[I]t is impossible to deal with the fourth factor [of the fair use 
analysis] except by recognizing that a silent record on an 
important factor bearing on fair use disentitled the proponent of 
the defense, [the defendant] 2 Live Crew, to summary judgment. 
The evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged on remand.125 
Clearly the court placed the burden of producing evidence to support fair 
use on the defendant. 
Presenting sufficient evidence often is identified as the burden of 
production. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court 
commented on the nature of the burden that it thought the defendant 
bore. Specifically addressing the fourth factor of fair use, market harm, 
the court stated: “Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent 
121. See, e.g., Barnes v. AT & T Pension Benefit Plan–Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 
1167, 1171–72 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
122. See Erickson Prods., Inc. v. Kast, No. 5:13-CV-05472 HRL, 2014 WL 1652478, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (granting motion to strike defendant’s fair use defense, albeit with leave to 
amend). 
123. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (noting that the burden of 
persuasion answers “which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced”). The Court has noted 
that, “[i]n truth, however, very few cases will be in evidentiary equipoise.” Id. at 58. 
124. That evidence would need to meet the standard applicable in a civil case: a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
125. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994). On remand, the parties 
agreed to a settlement that gave 2 Live Crew a license to use ‘‘Oh, Pretty Woman.’’ See STAN 
SOOCHER, THEY FOUGHT THE LAW: ROCK MUSIC GOES TO COURT 189–90 (1999). 
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would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use 
without favorable evidence about relevant markets.”126 For a defendant, 
such favorable evidence would mean proving the lack of harm to 
relevant markets. Yet evidence of the presence of something (harm), 
rather than evidence of the absence of something (lack of harm), is often 
far easier evidence to provide, and “a determination . . . which party, if 
either has better access to relevant evidence” is a relevant consideration 
when considering whether a defense should be treated as an “affirmative 
defense.”127 In the context of a copyright infringement lawsuit, the 
plaintiff typically is in a better position to provide evidence of the 
presence of harm to relevant markets if such harm exists.128 Thus 
characterizing fair use as an affirmative defense places the burden on the 
wrong party. 
At least one recent fair use case has endorsed the appropriateness of 
shifting the burden of production in just this context. The Eleventh 
Circuit has held that it in some circumstances, it is “reasonable to place 
on Plaintiffs the burden of going forward” with evidence on the fourth 
factor.129 The court looked to employment discrimination law as an 
example of this burden shifting approach.130 It noted that it was adopting 
this burden shifting approach because of the facts of the case at bar: 
“This approach merely recognizes that this is a case wherein one party 
126. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
127. Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987). 
128. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate some harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is 
consistent with copyright law’s historical roots in tort doctrine. See Bohannan, supra note 20, at 
974–81 (exploring the historical approach to harm in copyright law). In addition to the fourth factor 
and its inquiry into the harm to the copyright owner’s markets, Section 107 directs courts to 
consider the purpose of the use. 17 U.S.C. §107(1) (2012). In general, courts have focused on the 
objective manifestations of that purpose rather than the putative fair user’s subjectively intended 
purposes.  See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting what matters is not 
the “stated intention” of the creator of the alleged infringing work, but rather how the work “appears 
to the reasonable observer”).  For a further discussion of the role of intent in a fair use analysis, see 
Eva Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935 (2014). A focus on objective 
manifestations of the purpose of the work does not rely on evidence to which the defendant has 
better access. 
129. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). 
130. Id. Specifically the Eleventh Circuit cited Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 
1041 (11th Cir. 1989): “[I]n a case brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
‘the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that age was a determinative factor in the 
employer’s decision to terminate his employment,’ but that after the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case of discrimination, this creates a presumption that age was a determinative factor and the 
defendant then has the burden to go forward with evidence of ‘a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
rationale for the discharge,’ after which the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s purported 
reason was merely a pretext.” Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Verbraeken, 881 
F.2d at 1045). 
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has all the evidence on a particular issue, and so it is equitable to require 
that party to go forward with the evidence.”131 
Even the Eleventh Circuit, however, notes that while the burden of 
production may shift, because fair use is an affirmative defense, the 
burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.132 At common law, the 
burden of proving “affirmative defenses—indeed, ‘all . . . circumstances 
of justification, excuse or alleviation’—rested on the defendant.”133 This 
common law rule accords with the general evidentiary rule that “the 
burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion with regard to any 
given issue are both generally allocated to the same party.”134 The need 
to shift the burden of production is an indication that the burden of 
persuasion on fair use has not been properly allocated. 
One tactic to meet the burden of production that defendants asserting 
fair use have successfully employed is to use various discovery tools to 
force the copyright owner to acknowledge a lack of any evidence of 
harm. For example, when the Authors Guild sued HathiTrust, asserting 
that its use of the corpus of scanned books from the collection of 
HathiTrust member libraries constituted infringement, HathiTrust 
claimed there was no evidence of harm to any relevant markets. In 
interrogatories, defendant HathiTrust requested the Authors Guide 
“identify ‘any specific, quantifiable past harm, or any documents 
relating to any such past harm,’ resulting from any of the Libraries’ uses 
of their works.”135 When the Authors Guild identified none, both the 
district court and the Second Circuit accepted this as evidence favorable 
to the defendant in ruling that the use was fair.136 
In addition to having consequences for pleading requirements and for 
the burden of production, treating fair use strictly as an affirmative 
defense makes resisting motions for preliminary injunctions more 
difficult. When a copyright owner moves for a preliminary injunction 
the owner must prove a likelihood of success on the merits.137 When the 
defendant raises the defense of fair use, because the burden of proving 
131. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1279 n.34. 
132. Id. at 1280.  
133. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *201). 
134. 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (5th ed. 1999). 
135. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Brief for Appellee 
at 38 (citing Pls.’ Resps. to Interrogs.)). 
136. Id. 
137. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
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that defense has not been placed on the copyright owner, demonstrating 
a likely lack of fair use is not required.138 Instead, defendant must show 
that the defense of fair use is likely to succeed.139 The relative ease of 
granting a preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement case has 
serious consequences for freedom of speech. Copyright, by its nature, 
concerns creative expression.140 When copyright is used to enjoin the 
defendant’s activity, it is often being used to prevent the defendant from 
speaking in the defendant’s desired way.141 By placing the burden on the 
defendant, treating fair use as an affirmative defense makes it easier for 
the plaintiff to obtain a requested preliminary injunction. 
C. Amplifying the Burden on Speech 
The First Amendment ramifications of treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense extend beyond the preliminary injunction context. 
Because fair use is fundamental to protecting free speech rights and to 
keeping copyright from requiring “further First Amendment scrutiny,”142 
placing the burden of proof on the defendant is problematic.143 Many fair 
uses involve speech activities.144 Yet characterizing the fair use doctrine 
as an affirmative defense places a burden on the speaker to prove an 
entitlement to speak. Contrast that with requiring one who seeks to 
silence particular speech to prove a clear entitlement to prevent that 
speech. Treating fair use as an affirmative defense places an unnecessary 
138. In 2007 a panel of the Ninth Circuit directly addressed this issue, first ruling that the 
copyright owner “had the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of overcoming [the defendant’s] fair 
use defense under 17 U.S.C. § 107.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th 
Cir. 2007), amended and superseded on reh’g, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). However, upon 
rehearing the panel held “[b]ecause ‘the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the 
burdens at trial,’ once the moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood of success on 
the merits, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show a likelihood that its affirmative 
defense will succeed.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)). 
139. Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1158. 
140. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (identifying that copyright protection exists in “original works of 
authorship”). 
141. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165–69, 182–89 (1998) (exploring copyright as a restraint on 
speech and the particular problems with preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases). 
142. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
143. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After 
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 719–22 (2003) (arguing that placing 
the burden of proof on the defendant violates due process first amendment rights). 
144. Snow, supra note 35, at 1793–95. 
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and inappropriate burden on free speech.145 
Even prior to the filing of any lawsuit, treating fair use as a defense 
chills more speech than if fair use were considered part of the analysis of 
infringement.146 Knowing that entitlement to rely on fair use requires 
one to prove that defense may deter speech that would otherwise occur if 
the burden were allocated differently. 
The case-by-case nature of fair use147 amplifies the chilling effect of 
treating fair use as an affirmative defense.148 Because the Supreme Court 
has held that fair use determinations are not to be simplified by bright 
line rules, the exact contours of what constitutes fair use are ill-
defined.149 This lack of definition makes reliance on fair use troubling 
from a free speech perspective. The burdens imposed by vague statutes 
directed at speech heighten the First Amendment concerns.150 “The 
inherent uncertainty of fair use magnifies a defendant’s burden of 
proof . . . .”151 These significant First Amendment consequences further 
bolster the approach to treating fair use as part of the inquiry into 
infringement, not as a separate inquiry to be undertaken after the 
plaintiff has demonstrated more than de minimis copying.152 
V. TREATING FAIR USE DIFFERENTLY—AS A DEFENSE 
Campbell’s embrace of the notion that fair use is an affirmative 
defense was not simply part of the evolution of the fair use doctrine. 
Rather, it was an error of statutory interpretation with seriously 
problematic First Amendment consequences. Twenty years have passed 
since the Campbell decision. Is it too late to reconsider this fundamental 
aspect of fair use? 
In codifying the doctrine of fair use there is indication in the 
145. See id. 
146. Id. at 1795–98. 
147. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
148. Some have also noted that the exceedingly long duration of copyright makes the burden on 
speech even more significant. See, e.g., Kate O’Neill, The Content of Their Characters: J.D. 
Salinger, Holden Caulfield, Fredrik Colting, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291, 333–34 (2012). 
149. Professor Pamela Samuelson argues that fair use cases fall into predictable patterns that 
make anticipating the boundaries of fair use easier to discern than many fear. Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541–43 (2009). 
150. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2001). 
151. Snow, supra note 35, at 1791. 
152. See supra Part I.A (discussing the ease of proving the elements of the prima facie case of 
infringement). 
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legislative history that Congress did not intend 
to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of 
rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory 
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria 
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is 
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.153 
This legislative history envisions the fair use doctrine evolving to 
address new uses on a case-by-case basis. It does not appear to endorse a 
blank check approach, allowing the Supreme Court to fundamentally 
alter the nature of the doctrine of fair use. There is an important 
difference between treating fair use as addressing the appropriate scope 
of a copyright owner’s rights and the propriety or impropriety of a 
defendant’s use of copyrighted expression, and requiring the defendant 
bear the burden of proof concerning important factors that inform a 
careful case-by-case evaluation of the unlawfulness of defendant’s 
conduct. 
Given the negative consequences of treating fair use as an affirmative 
defense identified in Part IV, what would happen if courts approached 
fair use as merely a defense, not an affirmative defense? The pleading 
requirement would fall away, although certainly many defendants would 
raise the defense in their answers. If fair use were not an affirmative 
defense, an omission of the defense from the answer would not preclude 
consideration of the doctrine by the court. More significantly, as directed 
by the statutory language, considerations of the four factors identified in 
Section 107 would become part of the analysis of whether or not the 
defendant’s actions constitute an infringement.154 And with the plaintiff 
bearing the burden of proving infringement, which would encompass 
proof that the use was not fair, when the evidence was in equipoise, 
when the question of fair use was a close one, the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case would fail. 
While Congress could act to clarify that fair use should not be treated 
as an affirmative defense, it is also possible for the courts to re-examine 
153. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Section 107 provides that a fair use “is not an infringement.” 
See supra Part II.A. As the Eleventh Circuit has done with the “affirmative defense” of fair use, 
courts could employ a careful shifting of the burden of production in appropriate cases. See supra 
notes 129–132 and accompanying text. For example, where the defendant might have better access 
to relevant information concerning an element of fair use, it would be appropriate to shift the burden 
of production to the defendant. However, the burden of persuasion as to whether the use is or is not 
infringement would remain with the plaintiff. 
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what Congress intended when it first codified the fair use doctrine. The 
Supreme Court has not engaged in a detailed examination the statute, the 
legislative history, and the policy arguments. If it did so, it should 
conclude that fair use should be treated as a defense, but not an 
affirmative defense. 
CONCLUSION 
In Campbell the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in part because the 
lower court had read one sentence in Sony to mean that there was a 
presumption of unfairness when the defendant’s use was commercial. 
Sony, however, had said just that.155 But in Campbell, the Court held it 
was not just error, but reversible error to employ such a presumption. 
The Court expressly cautioned the lower courts to not take one isolated 
statement out of context. Unfortunately, in Campbell, the court took one 
isolated word, “affirmative,” used in Harper & Row and gave it more 
heft than it deserved given the text of the statute and the legislative 
history. 
The difference between a “defense” and an “affirmative defense” may 
seem to be one of degree, but in the context of fair use, it is an important 
distinction with significant consequences. When a defendant asserts that 
the reason he is not an infringer is that his activity is a fair use, the court 
should consider the question of infringement holistically. The factors 
that Congress provide in Section 107 are designed to help a court make 
the assessment whether the use should be treated as an infringement 
within the scope of the copyright owner’s rights or should, instead, be 
classified as a fair use and be permitted without interference from the 
copyright owner. Removing the modifier “affirmative” from our 
understanding of the fair use doctrine, will make clear the appropriate 
approach to fair use that Congress intended. 
 
155. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417, 449 (1984) (stating that 
“[i]f the [defendant’s product] were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, 
such use would presumptively be unfair”). 
 
                                                     
